La Sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos de 9 de junio de 2026, Jiitee Työt Oy c. Finlandia (demanda núm. 2895/25), aborda una cuestión de notable relevancia para la práctica arbitral contemporánea: la compatibilidad con el art. 6.1 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos de un laudo arbitral dictado sin motivación cuando las partes han renunciado expresamente a ella. El Tribunal concluye, por unanimidad, que no existe vulneración del derecho a un proceso equitativo cuando dicha renuncia ha sido realizada de forma libre, lícita e inequívoca y se encuentra rodeada de garantías procedimentales suficientes.

Antecedentes

La controversia tuvo su origen en varios contratos celebrados entre dos sociedades mercantiles finlandesas para la ejecución de trabajos de reparación de túneles ferroviarios. Todos ellos contenían una cláusula arbitral que remitía las controversias al Instituto de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de Finlandia (FAI). Cuando surgió el litigio, ambas partes aceptaron someterse al procedimiento acelerado previsto en el Reglamento de la institución arbitral. Durante la conferencia inicial de gestión del procedimiento declararon expresamente que el laudo podía dictarse sin motivación y, posteriormente, tampoco ejercitaron la facultad que les otorgaba el reglamento para solicitar una decisión motivada dentro del plazo concedido por el árbitro. El laudo, finalmente, condenó a la demandada al pago de diversas cantidades superiores a 400.000 euros, sin incluir exposición de hechos ni fundamentación jurídica.

La sociedad condenada promovió entonces una acción de anulación alegando que la ausencia absoluta de motivación vulneraba el orden público finlandés y privaba a los tribunales estatales de la posibilidad de ejercer un control efectivo sobre la corrección jurídica de la decisión. Tanto el Tribunal de Distrito de Helsinki como el Tribunal de Apelación rechazaron esta argumentación, destacando que la legislación arbitral finlandesa no exige la motivación de los laudos cuando las partes han acordado otra cosa y que la propia demandante había aceptado reiteradamente la emisión de un laudo no motivado. El Tribunal Supremo denegó posteriormente la autorización para recurrir.

Ante el Tribunal de Estrasburgo, la demandante sostuvo que la motivación de las resoluciones constituye una garantía esencial del derecho a un proceso equitativo, pues permite a las partes comprender las razones de la decisión y facilita el control judicial de eventuales arbitrariedades. El TEDH reconoció que la obligación de motivar las decisiones forma parte, en principio, de las exigencias derivadas del art. 6.1 CEDH. Sin embargo, recordó igualmente su consolidada doctrina según la cual las partes que optan libremente por el arbitraje comercial pueden renunciar válidamente a determinadas garantías procesales, siempre que dicha renuncia sea libre, lícita e inequívoca y vaya acompañada de garantías mínimas proporcionadas a la importancia del derecho afectado.

Apreciaciones del Tribunal de Justicia

Aplicando estos criterios al caso concreto, el Tribunal declara que la demandante había aceptado voluntariamente el arbitraje acelerado, que había sido representada durante todo el procedimiento por abogados especializados y que había tenido varias oportunidades para solicitar una decisión motivada sin hacerlo. Asimismo, considera que el ordenamiento finlandés y el reglamento arbitral contenían diversos mecanismos destinados a garantizar el respeto de los principios fundamentales del procedimiento arbitral y a permitir el control judicial de irregularidades graves. En tales circunstancias, la Corte entiende que la obligación de motivar no posee un carácter tan fundamental que impida toda posibilidad de renuncia dentro de un arbitraje comercial voluntario.

De conformidad con la presente Sentencia:

 

(…)

 

The Court’s assessment

57. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. This Article thus enshrines the “right to a court”, of which the right of access – that is, the right to bring proceedings before courts in civil matters – constitutes one aspect only (see Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 171). This access to a court is not necessarily to be understood as access to a court of law of the classic kind, integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country; thus, the “tribunal” may be a body set up to determine a limited number of specific issues, provided always that it offers the appropriate guarantees (see Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, § 201, Series A no. 102). Article 6 does not therefore preclude the establishment of arbitral tribunals in order to settle certain pecuniary disputes between individuals (see Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10934/21, § 195, 10 July 2025, and Suda v. the Czech Republic, no. 1643/06, § 48, 28 October 2010). Arbitration clauses, which have undeniable advantages for the individuals concerned as well as for the administration of justice, do not in principle offend against the Convention (see Tabbane v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 41069/12, § 25, 1 March 2016; Semenya, cited above, § 195; and Mutu and Pechstein, cited above, § 94).
58. However, in accepting an arbitration clause, the parties voluntarily waive certain rights enshrined in the Convention (see Semenya, cited above, § 197, with further references, and Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 1742/05, 15 September 2009).

 

a) Whether there was a valid waiver of the right to a reasoned decision

 

59. The Court has pointed out that in the case of “voluntary arbitration to which consent has been freely given”, no real issue arises under Article 6. The parties to a dispute are free to take certain disagreements arising under a contract to a body other than an ordinary court of law. By signing an arbitration clause, the parties voluntarily waive certain rights secured by the Convention. Such a waiver is not incompatible with the Convention provided it is established in a free, lawful and unequivocal manner. In addition, in the case of certain Convention rights, a waiver, in order to be effective for Convention purposes, requires minimum guarantees commensurate with its importance (see Semenya, cited above, § 197; Tabbane, cited above, § 27; Mutu and Pechstein, cited above, § 96; and Eiffage S.A. and Others, cited above).
60. There is no doubt that a voluntary waiver of court proceedings in favour of arbitration is in principle acceptable from the point of view of Article 6. Even so, such a waiver should not necessarily be considered to amount to a waiver of all the rights under Article 6. An unequivocal waiver of Convention rights is valid only in so far as such a waiver is “permissible”. A waiver may be permissible with regard to certain rights but not with regard to certain others. A distinction may even have to be made between different rights guaranteed by Article 6 (see Suovaniemi and Others v. Finland (dec.), no. 31737/96, 23 February 1999).
61. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that while the Government considered that the applicant company had agreed in a free, lawful and unequivocal manner to the application of the Rules for Expedited Arbitration (see paragraph 52 above), and had therefore expressly waived its right to a reasoned decision altogether on three separate occasions (see paragraph 54 above), the applicant company submitted that dispensing entirely with reasons could not be treated as a valid waiver where it prevented effective judicial scrutiny of the legality of an award and protection against arbitrariness (see paragraph 49 above).
62. The Court observes first of all that in cases of voluntary arbitration the fact that “no real issue arises under Article 6” (see paragraph 59 above) does not mean that the safeguards provided by Article 6 of the Convention are not applicable to such cases. A waiver is compatible with the Convention provided it is established in a free, lawful and unequivocal manner. In the present case, the applicant company freely and voluntarily accepted to have recourse to expedited arbitration. The District Court held in its judgment that it was undisputed that the contract between the parties had included an arbitration clause and that the parties had agreed to apply the Rules for Expedited Arbitration of the Finland Chamber of Commerce to the arbitration proceedings (see paragraph 13 above). As noted by the Government, there was no indication that the applicant company had acted under duress in signing the arbitration agreement, nor was there even a claim to that effect (see paragraph 56 above).
63. As to the lawfulness of the waiver, the Court notes that, under section 23 of the Arbitration Act, the proceedings were to be conducted in accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the parties (see paragraph 22 above). There is nothing in the Constitution of Finland or the Arbitration Act (see paragraphs 20-29 above) that prevented a party to such proceedings from waiving his or her rights. Moreover, the Rules for Expedited Arbitration and the Arbitration Act contain several procedural safeguards making it possible to object to any failure to comply with any provision of the Rules (see paragraph 30 above) and to have an arbitral award declared null and void and/or set aside (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). In this sense, the waiver in the present case was established in a lawful manner in accordance with the Constitution, the Arbitration Act and the Rules for Expedited Arbitration.
64. As to the unequivocal manner in which the waiver was established, the Court notes that in Beg S.p.a. v. Italy (no. 5312/11, §§ 143 and 153‑54, 20 May 2021) – a case concerning commercial voluntary arbitration – it found that the applicant company could not be considered to have unequivocally waived both the guarantee of impartiality of the arbitrators and the expectation that the domestic courts would ensure that the arbitral award complied with the relevant rules relating to the impartiality of the arbitrators. Consequently, the arbitration proceedings had had to afford the safeguards provided for under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Since in that case the arbitrator’s impartiality had been open to doubt, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
65. In the present case, the question is whether, in a similar manner, a complete lack of reasoning in the arbitral award in question led to a violation because of the lack of proper safeguards under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

 

b) Whether a waiver of the right to a reasoned decision is permissible

 

66. The right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention includes the right of the parties to the trial to submit any observations that they consider relevant to their case. The purpose of the Convention being to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective, this right can only be seen to be effective if the observations are actually “heard”, that is, duly considered by the trial court. In other words, the effect of Article 6 is, among other things, to place the “tribunal”, within the meaning of that provision, under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant (see, for example, Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 80, ECHR 2004-I, and Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, § 89, 28 June 2007). They are thus under an obligation to provide reasons for their decisions, and compliance with this duty must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case. While the courts cannot be required to state the reasons for rejecting each argument of a party, they are nonetheless not relieved of the obligation to undertake a proper examination of and respond to the main pleas put forward by that party (see Wagner and J.M.W.L., cited above, §§ 90 and 96), and parties should expect a specific and express reply to those submissions which are decisive for the outcome of the proceedings in question (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 185, 6 November 2018).
67. The Court notes that there is no indication in the present case that the applicant company’s right to be heard was violated or that its observations were not duly considered by the arbitral tribunal. Moreover, the District Court found that it was undisputed that the applicant company and the M. company had confirmed that they had been offered an adequate opportunity to present their case. The applicant company did not maintain, for example, that the arbitrator had applied a law other than the one agreed on by the parties (see paragraph 14 above).
68. Turning to the question of reasoning, the Court notes that the Finnish Constitution and the Arbitration Act do not require that arbitral awards be reasoned (see paragraphs 12 and 20 above). According to the preparatory work on the Arbitration Act, such provisions were not proposed for the current Act since they would have entailed a need to provide for an opportunity to annul an unreasoned arbitral award, which would have given rise to unnecessary judicial proceedings and slowed down the dispute settlement (see paragraph 29 above). Nor do international treaties require reasons to be given if the parties have assented to an arbitral procedure under which it is not customary to give reasons for awards and neither party requests them (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above).
69. In the present case, the District Court held that the applicant company had agreed to the application of the Rules for Expedited Arbitration and had failed to request a reasoned arbitral award, despite being aware that, under the Rules, no reasons would be given unless requested. It was also undisputed that, at their first case management conference, the parties had agreed that no reasons needed to be given in the arbitral award. Similarly, it was undisputed that the arbitrator had set a time-limit in accordance with the Rules for Expedited Arbitration, and that neither party had requested a reasoned award within the time-limit (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 13 above). Nor had the applicant company objected to any failure to comply with any provision of the Rules for Expedited Arbitration, despite having the possibility of doing so during the arbitration proceedings (see paragraph 30 above). As the Government pointed out, the applicant company expressly and unequivocally waived the right to have a reasoned arbitral award on several occasions. Moreover, the applicant company was represented by two lawyers (see paragraph 54 above).
70. It should also be taken into account that the domestic law and the Rules for Expedited Arbitration contained several procedural safeguards making it possible to object to any failure to comply with the Rules and to have an arbitral award declared null and void and/or set aside (see paragraph 63 above). In this context, the Court does not consider that an obligation to state reasons constitutes such a fundamental procedural principle as to render its waiver impermissible in voluntary arbitration proceedings, provided that other requirements of valid waiver are fulfilled (see the case‑law quoted in paragraphs 59-60 above).

 

c) Conclusions

 

71. Taking into account all the elements above, the Court considers that the applicant company’s waiver of its right to a reasoned decision was established in a free, lawful and unequivocal manner and came with minimum guarantees that were commensurate with its importance.
72. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

 

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

 

1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

 

Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 June 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 

Nota

La principal aportación de esta sentencia radica en la afirmación de que la motivación del laudo, aun siendo una garantía procesal relevante, no integra el núcleo indisponible del derecho a un proceso equitativo en el ámbito del arbitraje comercial voluntario. La decisión refuerza así la autonomía de la voluntad como principio estructural del arbitraje y legitima los modelos de arbitraje acelerado que sacrifican determinados niveles de fundamentación en favor de la rapidez, la eficiencia y la reducción de costes. La doctrina sentada por el TEDH adquiere una relevancia particular en el contexto de las nuevas Reglas de Arbitraje de la ICC de 2026, especialmente respecto del procedimiento de arbitraje altamente acelerado previsto en el nuevo Anexo VI. La posibilidad de recurrir a un árbitro único, limitar la actividad probatoria, resolver exclusivamente sobre la base de documentos e incluso prescindir de una motivación extensa encuentra ahora un respaldo adicional en la jurisprudencia europea de derechos humanos, siempre que tales limitaciones respondan a una elección consciente e informada de las partes. La sentencia confirma, en definitiva, que el equilibrio entre celeridad y garantías procesales puede configurarse válidamente mediante la autonomía privada sin entrar en conflicto con las exigencias del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos.