La Sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos de 7 de julio de 2026 (caso Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal) delimita el alcance de la libertad de expresión de los clubes de fútbol y de sus dirigentes en relación con las críticas dirigidas a la actuación arbitral. El Tribunal declara que la imposición de sanciones disciplinarias por acusaciones de corrupción y manipulación de partidos resultó compatible con el artículo 10 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos cuando carecían de una base fáctica suficiente, aunque aprecia una vulneración de dicho precepto respecto de unas manifestaciones que constituían una crítica legítima a la actuación de un árbitro.

 Antecedentes

 El asunto tiene su origen en diversos expedientes disciplinarios incoados por el Consejo de Disciplina de la Federación Portuguesa de Fútbol contra el Futebol Clube do Porto SAD, su director de comunicación, Francisco José de Carvalho Marques, y su presidente, Jorge Nuno Pinto da Costa, como consecuencia de diversas declaraciones difundidas entre 2017 y 2019 en medios de comunicación, programas televisivos del canal Porto Canal y publicaciones oficiales del club. Las sanciones consistieron en multas comprendidas entre 459 y 15.300 euros y, en algunos casos, en suspensiones temporales de sus cargos.

Las autoridades disciplinarias entendieron que los interesados habían sobrepasado los límites de la crítica deportiva al imputar a determinados árbitros y al Consejo de Arbitraje actuaciones parciales, corruptas o dirigidas a favorecer a un club rival. Los recursos interpuestos ante el Tribunal Arbitral del Deporte portugués, los tribunales administrativos y el Tribunal Supremo Administrativo fueron desestimados, salvo en uno de los procedimientos, relativo a unas manifestaciones que el Tribunal Arbitral había considerado una mera crítica técnica al desempeño arbitral. Finalmente, el Tribunal Supremo Administrativo confirmó también la sanción en ese supuesto, lo que dio lugar a la demanda ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos.

 Apreciaciones del TEDH

 El Tribunal recuerda que la libertad de expresión protege especialmente las manifestaciones formuladas en debates de interés público y que el fútbol profesional constituye un ámbito de evidente relevancia social. En ese contexto, los árbitros, por el papel que desempeñan y la exposición pública inherente a sus funciones, deben soportar un mayor grado de crítica que un ciudadano ordinario cuando las manifestaciones se refieren a su actuación profesional y no a su vida privada.

No obstante, el Tribunal distingue cuidadosamente entre la crítica severa del rendimiento arbitral y la imputación de conductas ilícitas. Las acusaciones de corrupción, manipulación de encuentros o connivencia institucional constituyen juicios de valor que únicamente quedan amparados por el artículo 10 cuando descansan sobre una base fáctica suficiente. En cinco de las seis demandas acumuladas, los demandantes no aportaron elementos objetivos que respaldasen tales acusaciones, por lo que las autoridades nacionales actuaron dentro de su margen de apreciación al considerar proporcionadas las sanciones disciplinarias.

Una solución distinta merece, sin embargo, la demanda presentada por el FC Porto relativa a unas declaraciones que únicamente cuestionaban la imparcialidad del árbitro y criticaban su actuación durante el encuentro. El Tribunal observa que esas manifestaciones no imputaban corrupción ni amaño de partidos, sino que expresaban una valoración crítica del desempeño arbitral, habitual en el debate deportivo. Al no haber diferenciado adecuadamente entre ambas categorías de expresiones, el Tribunal Supremo Administrativo portugués restringió de manera desproporcionada la libertad de expresión del club.

De acuerdo con la presente decisión

 

The Court’s assessment

(a)  Whether there was interference

102. The parties did not dispute that the disciplinary sanctions in question had amounted to “interference” with the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of expression (see paragraphs 95 and 98 above). The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.
103. Such interference will constitute a breach of Article 10 unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims set out in this Article, and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of those aims.

 

(b)  Whether the interference was “prescribed by law”

 

104. 104.  The parties agreed that the impugned interference was “prescribed by law”. The Court also notes that the interference complained of was prescribed by Articles 19, 112, 136 and 141 of the Disciplinary Regulations (see paragraphs 24, 36, 50, 62, 76 and 87 above).

 

(c)  Whether the interference pursued a “legitimate aim”

105. The parties agreed that the interference had aimed to protect the reputation and rights of others – in the instant case, the reputation and rights of football referees and football bodies (see paragraphs 95 and 98 above). The Court accepts that it is a legitimate aim under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention (compare Armellini and Others v. Austria, no. 14134/07, § 45, 16 April 2015).
106. However, the Court is not persuaded by the Government’s argument that the prevention of public disorder, also a legitimate aim under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, was at stake in the present case (see paragraph 98 above) taking into account that there was only a brief reference to conduct inciting violence, conflict and indiscipline in the judgment of the Sports Arbitration Court of 30 September 2019 in relation to application no. 47902/20(see paragraph 65 above) and the judgment of the CACS of 9 September 2021 in relation to the second applicant in application no. 3708/22 (see paragraph 83 above, compare Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, § 153, ECHR 2015 (extracts); and contrast Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992, § 39, Series A no. 236).
107. Having concluded that the interference was provided for by law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others, it remains to be established whether the interference at issue was “necessary in a democratic society”.

 

(d)  Whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society

 

(i)     The general principles

108. The general principles concerning the question of whether an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression is “necessary in a democratic society” are well established in the Court’s case-law and have been summarised inNIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova ([GC], no. 28470/12, § 177, 5 April 2022).
109. The Court reiterates that the right to protection of reputation is a right which is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life. In order for Article 8 to come into play, however, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (seeBédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 72, 29 March 2016, and Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, § 83, 7 February 2012). In such instances, the Court may be required to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance when protecting the two values guaranteed by the Convention – namely, on the one hand, freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10, and, on the other, the right to respect for private life, as enshrined in Article 8 (see Matalas v. Greece, no. 1864/18, § 40, 25 March 2021). In cases which require the right to respect for private life to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression, the Court considers that the outcome of the application should not, in theory, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 8 or under Article 10 of the Convention. Indeed, as a matter of principle these rights deserve equal respect. Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should in theory be the same in both cases (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], no. 40454/07, § 91, ECHR 2015 (extracts), and Perinçek, cited above, § 198).
110. Under Article 10 of the Convention, the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent an interference with the freedom of expression protected by this provision is necessary. However, this margin goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those delivered by an independent court(Axel Springer AG, cited above, §§ 85-86). Noting that national authorities are nevertheless better placed than the Court itself to understand and appreciate the specific societal problems faced in particular communities and contexts, or the likely impact of certain acts that they are called upon to adjudicate (Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, § 189, 15 May 2023), in exercising its supervisory function, the Court’s task is not to take the place of the national courts but rather to review, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of appreciation are compatible with the provisions of the Convention relied on (Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 105, ECHR 2012).
111. The Court has identified a number of relevant criteria that must guide its assessment when balancing freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8. These include contribution to a debate of general interest; how well known the person concerned is and the subject of the statements in question; his or her prior conduct; the method of obtaining the information and its veracity; the content, form and consequences of the statements; and the severity of the sanction imposed (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, §§ 89-95, and Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 93). These criteria are not exhaustive and have been transposed and adapted by the Court in the light of the particular circumstances of the case (see, for example,Mesić v. Croatia, no. 19362/18, § 86, 5 May 2022).
112. Furthermore, in its judgments in Lingens v. Austria(8 July 1986, § 46, Series A no. 103) and Oberschlick v. Austria (23 May 1991, § 63, Series A no. 204), the Court drew a distinction between statements of fact and value judgments. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. The requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10. However, where a statement amounts to a value judgment, the proportionality of an interference may depend on whether there exists a sufficient “factual basis” for the impugned statement: if there is not, that value judgment may prove excessive. In order to distinguish between a factual allegation and a value judgment, it is necessary to take account of the circumstances of the case and the general tone of the remark, bearing in mind that assertions about matters of public interest may, on that basis, constitute value judgments rather than statements of fact (see Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, § 126, ECHR 2015, with further references therein).
113. 113.  The nature and severity of the sanctions imposed are also factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of the interference. As the Court has previously pointed out, interference with freedom of expression may have a chilling effect on the exercise of that freedom. The relatively moderate nature of a fine does not suffice to negate the risk of a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression (see, § 127).
114. Lastly, where the balancing exercise between the rights under Article 8 and under Article 10 has been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts (see Danileţ v. Romania[GC], no. 16915/21, § 169, 15 December 2025, and further references therein). In exercising its supervisory function, the Court’s task is not to take the place of the national courts, but rather to review, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the decisions they have taken fall within their margin of appreciation and are compatible with the provisions of the Convention relied on (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 86).

 

(ii)  Application of these principles to the present case

 

115. Examining the nature of the impugned statements, the Court finds that they were capable of tarnishing the reputation of the referees and sporting bodies concerned, and of causing them prejudice in both their professional and social environment. Accordingly, it accepts that the accusations made attained the requisite level of seriousness to cause prejudice to the enjoyment by the referees concerned and the Refereeing Council of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention (compare, mutatis mutandis, Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina[GC], no. 17224/11, § 79, 27 June 2017; Stancu and Others v. Romania, no. 22953/16, § 121, 18 October 2022; and Sytnyk v. Ukraine, no. 16497/20, §§ 108-109, 24 April 2025). The Court must therefore ascertain whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance between the two values guaranteed by the Convention – namely, on the one hand, the applicants’ freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10, and, on the other, the right to respect for reputation of the referees concerned and the Refereeing Council, under Article 8 (concerning the reputation of a legal entity, see Freitas Rangel v. Portugal, no. 78873/13, § 53, 11 January 2022).

 

(α)    Contribution to a debate of public interest

116. The parties agreed that the matter at issue had been of public interest (see paragraphs 95 and 99 above). The Court also finds that the matter under discussion was of public interest, in that it concerned the possible manipulation of sports competitions and fraud (compare Armellini and Others, cited above, § 44). Moreover, the public debate surrounding questions of bias and the lack of impartiality in football was very intense at the material time and widely discussed in the media, including by the governing bodies of the PFF; those bodies, while acknowledging mistakes, also noted the existence of an environment of suspicion and incitement to hatred (see paragraphs 11-13 above; compare Colaço Mestre and SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicação,S.A., cited above, § 27).

 

(β)     How well known the persons and entities concerned are

117. 117.  The applicants stated that referees and sporting bodies should be considered public figures. The Government also acknowledged that football referees and the heads of sporting bodies were subject to substantial public exposure on account of their special role in the context of football (see paragraphs 95 and 99 above).
118. The Court is of the opinion that referees participating in high‑ranking football competitions are indeed subject to a degree of public exposure, in the light of their central role in football matches, the effect of their decisions and the high level of public attention they receive. Consequently, the Court finds that when referees are acting in this capacity, they may be subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary citizens (see, mutatis mutandis, Janowski v. Poland[GC], no. 25716/94, § 33, ECHR 1999-I; July and SARL Libération v. France, no. 20893/03, § 74, ECHR 2008 (extracts); and Morice, cited above, § 131) and may thus be expected to endure harsh criticism, even if it is hostile in tone. The Court finds that this reasoning can also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to refereeing bodies on account of the tasks entrusted to them in the context of football.
119. The Court further notes that the impugned statements did not appear to relate directly to the referees’ private lives, but rather to their professional conduct and public performance as referees (compare Colaço Mestre and SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicação, S.A., cited above, § 28). In the light of these considerations, a higher threshold for restricting the right to freedom of expression would, prima facie, be applied in the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 91).

 

(γ)     The content, form and consequences of the impugned statements

120. The Court notes that almost all of the applicants’ statements were made in the aftermath of football matches between Portuguese clubs, including F.C. Porto and Benfica (see paragraphs 10, 18, 19, 33, 34, 45, 72 and 73 above); they were made in media affiliated with F.C. Porto (see paragraphs 9, 14, 18, 19, 33, 34, 45, 60 and 72 above), and were reproduced or reiterated in other football newspapers (see paragraphs 15, 16, 46, 47 and 73 above).
121. In their statements, the applicants started by criticising the technical performance of the referees involved and what they perceived to be blatant mistakes (see paragraphs 18, 33, 34, 45, 60 and 73 above). The Court points out that such critical remarks are commonly made in the context of football, where incidents during a match often give rise to varying and contested interpretations and opinions, often influenced by club affiliations, such as the applicants’ connections with F.C. Porto in the present case.
122.  However, the applicants were not sanctioned for that criticism, but for breaching the right to honour and reputation of referees and sporting bodies. The Disciplinary Council sanctioned them for the allegations which they had made about corruption and match manipulation (see paragraphs 14‑16, 33-34, 45 and 72-73 above), and, as regards application no. 47902/20, for their allegations about a lack of impartiality (see paragraph 60 above). In particular, they were sanctioned on account of the following statements:

– as regards application no. 29978/19 (the first applicant), for stating that “… the referees J.F., T.M. and F.V. had become international referees because of a monster [which had been] … created to control the referees and thus the outcome of competitions”, and that there was “no doubt about there being a backdrop to this, a [puppet master] which [went] by the name Benfica” (see paragraph 24 above);

– as regards application no. 37235/19 (the applicant company), for its insinuations that an “octopus” and a “monster” controlled Portuguese football and the Refereeing Council (see paragraphs 24 above);

– as regards application no. 34185/19 (the first applicant), for stating that the referee N.A. had acted “in cahoots with Benfica” and that “sporting truth [had been] grossly tampered with by the referee N.A.” (see paragraph 36 above);

– as regards application no. 29703/19 (the first applicant), for stating that the referee J.F. had “completed the hat trick”, that referee teams had influenced the results of matches following a meeting between Benfica and the Refereeing Council, and that the results of the matches were a “consequence of the pressure, of the coercion that Benfica [wa]s applying to referees” (see paragraphs 50 and 54 above);

– as regards application no. 47902/20 (the applicant company), for stating that the referee B.P. “seem[ed] to have an issue with impartiality, and this m[ight] and should lead to his withdrawal from the matches which w[ould] decide the championship” (see paragraphs 62 and 71 above);

– as regards application no. 3708/22 (the second applicant), on account of several allegations of corruption and match manipulation made in respect of the refereeing system (see paragraphs 76 and 83 above).

123. The Court observes that after conducting a detailed assessment of the disputed facts and the context in which the statements had been made, the domestic courts took the view that those allegations were value judgments which had gone beyond acceptable criticism of the performance of the referees concerned and could therefore harm their honour and reputation because of their gratuitous and offensive character and the lack of an underlying minimal factual basis (see paragraphs 28, 31, 40, 43, 54, 58, 65, 68 and 69 above).
124. As regards the first applicant, in application no. 29703/19, the Court observes that in its judgment of 10 January 2019, the CACS identified what constituted admissible criticism and what did not; it explained that criticising the performance of referees, even with harsh words, was one thing, but instilling in the community, through conspiracy theories, the general idea of bias was something else (see paragraphs 36 and 58 above).
125. 125.  The parties agreed that the impugned statements constituted value judgments, but disagreed as to whether there was a minimal factual basis justifying the assertions made in those statements (see paragraphs 96 and 99 above). In view of their hyperbolic, exaggerated, metaphorical and speculative language, the Court also agrees that they can be analysed as value judgments. It remains to be examined whether the impugned statements reached a level of seriousness or gravity in view of their consequences, which requires a sufficient factual basis.

 

‒   The level of seriousness or gravity of the impugned statements in view of their consequences

126. 126.  As regards applications nos. 29978/19, 37235/19, 34185/19, 29703/19and 3708/22, the Court accepts that the allegations in issue (see paragraph 122 above) were extremely serious, as they implied that criminal offences had been committed and were specific and detailed; they were also reiterated several times and addressed the persons concerned by name. It also takes the view that accusations of corruption and match manipulation can seriously damage the personal and professional reputation of referees and may have important personal repercussions, as they touch upon the core ethical principles of sports (compare Armellini and Others, cited above, § 45).
127. 127.  In view of these aspects, whilst not disputing that corruption is an endemic scourge which undermines citizens’ trust in their institutions (see Creangă v. Romania[GC], no. 29226/03, § 108, 23 February 2012), the Court agrees that such allegations should have had sufficient factual basis sustaining their plausibility.
128. 128.  The Court does not take the same view as regards application no. 47902/20. In this connection, it notes that in its judgment of 2 July 2020, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the judgment that had been given by the CACS in favour of the applicant company without analysing the nature of the statements in issue, instead referring to a similar case (see paragraphs 68 and 71 above). However, the Court cannot but observe that the impugned statements made by the applicant company simply raised the issue of the lack of impartiality of the referee B.P. (see paragraphs 60 and 62 above); they did not imply that the referee B.P. had been corrupted in order to manipulate the result of the match, only that he had “an issue with impartiality” and that this “should lead to his withdrawal from the matches”. In the Court’s view, those statements were value judgments about a referee’s performance, which are common in the context of football competitions.

 

‒   The existence of a solid and sufficient basis

129. As regards applications nos. 29978/19, 37235/19, 34185/19, 29703/19and 3708/22, the Court notes that the applicants claimed before the domestic courts that they had merely exercised their right to objective criticism, and that they had had a sufficient factual basis for their suspicions (see paragraphs 26, 29, 37, 41, 52, 56, 63, 67, 75, 77 and 82 above). However, after assessing the evidence submitted, the domestic courts found that they had not proved the reasonableness or plausibility of their allegations (see paragraphs 31, 40, 54, 58, 71 and 83 above).
130. It is true that several newspapers, commentators and even sports officials remarked that an unusual number of refereeing mistakes had been made (see paragraphs 11-12 above). However, mere refereeing errors or irregularities, even if they are numerous or repeated over time, do not constitute, on their own, sufficient evidence of the existence of the scheme alleged by the applicants. Therefore, such speculative connections or assumptions were made by the applicants and conveyed to the wider public without a minimal factual basis. The domestic courts recognised this pattern when they referred to “conjectures”, “conspiracy theories” and a “narrative” (see the judgment of the CACS of 10 January 2019 quoted in paragraph 58 above).
131. 131.  Considering that as regards applications nos. 29978/19, 37235/19, 34185/19, 29703/19and 3708/22, the applicants did not provide any evidence to substantiate their accusations of corruption and match manipulation, the Court accepts that the statements amounted to value judgments devoid of a sufficient factual basis in view of the circumstances of the cases (compare Pais Pires de Lima, cited above, § 65). By contrast, as regards application no. 47902/20, as found in paragraph 128 above, it considers that the statements in question remained within the limits of acceptable criticism.

 

‒   The nature and severity of the sanctions imposed

132. As regards applications nos. 29978/19, 37235/19, 34185/19, 29703/19and 3708/22, the Court observes that the applicants were sanctioned under the Disciplinary Regulations of a private-law association by which they had voluntarily agreed to be bound. The sanctions consisted of fines and, in respect of the first and second applicants, temporary suspensions from their duties. While the Disciplinary Council of the Portuguese Professional Football League exercises public disciplinary powers pursuant to Article 1 of its Disciplinary Regulations (see paragraphs 24, 36, 54, 76 and 87 above), it is not empowered to impose criminal penalties such as deprivation of liberty. Moreover, the sanctions were imposed on the ground that the applicants had made allegations of corruption and match manipulation concerning the Refereeing Council and individual referees without a sufficient factual basis to support their plausibility, as assessed by the domestic authorities (see paragraphs 126-127 above).

(iii)  Conclusion

(α)    Applications nos. 29978/19, 37235/19, 34185/19, 29703/19 and 3708/22

133. In the light of the reasoning adopted by the national courts as regards applications nos. 29978/19, 37235/19, 34185/19, 29703/19and 3708/22, the Court concludes that they carried out an appropriate balancing exercise between the competing interests at stake, in accordance with the criteria derived from its case-law (see paragraphs 126-127 and 131 above; see also, a contrario, Naki and AMED Sportif Faaliyetler Kulübü Derneği, cited above, §§ 35-37; Sedat Doğan, cited above, §§ 41-42; and İbrahim Tokmak v. Turkey, no. 54540/16, §§ 35-36, 18 May 2021). The Court therefore discerns no strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, §§ 87-88).
134. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the applicants in these applications.

(β)     Application no. 47902/20

135. 135.  In view of the considerations set out above (see paragraph 128 above) regarding application no. 47902/20, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the applicant company.

 

1. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION (application no. 47902/20)

 

136. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

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